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Abstract
In a pathbreaking paper, Cover and Ordentlich (1998) solved a max-min
portfolio game between a trader (who picks an entire trading algorithm, θ(·))
and “nature,” who picks the matrix X of gross-returns of all stocks in all
periods. Their (zero-sum) game has the payoff kernel Wθ(X)/D(X), where
Wθ(X) is the trader’s final wealth and D(X) is the final wealth that would
have accrued to a $1 deposit into the best constant-rebalanced portfolio (or
fixed-fraction betting scheme) determined in hindsight. The resulting “univer-
sal portfolio” compounds its money at the same asymptotic rate as the best
rebalancing rule in hindsight, thereby beating the market asymptotically under
extremely general conditions.
Smitten with this (1998) result, the present paper solves the most general
tractable version of Cover and Ordentlich’s (1998) max-min game. This obtains
for performance benchmarks (read: derivatives) that are separately convex and
homogeneous in each period’s gross-return vector. For completely arbitrary
(even non-measurable) performance benchmarks, we show how the axiom of
choice can be used to “find” an exact maximin strategy for the trader.
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1 Introduction: volatility harvesting
Any buy-and-hold portfolio or passive index that holds shares of all stocks will com-
pound its money at the same asymptotic rate as the best performing stock in the
market. Since the portfolio is never rebalanced, the fraction of wealth held in the
stock with the highest growth rate approaches 100% in the long run. Thus, from the
standpoint of asymptotic growth, all buy-and-hold strategies (that have full support)
are equivalent.
Under mild conditions on the price process of the stock market, there will exist
trading strategies that guarantee to compound one’s money at a higher asymptotic
rate than every buy-and-hold strategy. For markets with iid returns of known dis-
tribution, the asymptotically dominant strategy is called the Kelly Rule (1956). In
Kelly betting, the gambler acts each period so as to maximize the expected log of
his capital. Literally, he maximizes the expected continuously-compounded capital
growth rate over the period throughout which the portfolio is held. By the law of
large numbers, the realized growth rate converges to the expected growth rate almost
surely.
A Kelly gambler will rebalance the portfolio each period, maintaining a certain
growth-optimal fraction of wealth in each stock. Swensen (2005) gives an excellent
practical discussion of allocation drift and rebalancing to the target allocation, espe-
cially within the context of institutional endowments. Even for agents whose utility
is not measured by the asymptotic growth rate, rebalancing serves to continuously
maintain the desired risk/return profile. For one thing, the Yale endowment has
exploited its tax-advantaged status to earn substantial profits from frequent (even
intraday) rebalancing.
The log-optimal rebalancing rule manufactures excess asymptotic growth through
a phenomenon called volatility harvesting. Luenberger (1998) calls it “volatility
pumping.” Poundstone (2010) uses the term “Shannon’s Demon” on account of
Shannon’s canonical example, given in a lecture at MIT.
Consider a world with cash (that pays no interest) and a single, volatile stock.
Each period, there is a 50% chance that the stock price doubles, and a 50% chance
that the price gets cut in half. Imagine an investor who starts with a dollar and keeps
100% of his wealth in the stock. After t periods, his expected wealth is 1.25t, but his
expected log-wealth is zero. His asymptotic capital growth rate will almost surely be
zero.
By contrast, the growth-optimal policy is to keep half of wealth in the stock and
half in cash at all times. Whenever the stock doubles, the Kelly gambler must sell
some shares to restore the target allocation. Likewise, when the stock price gets
cut in half, he must summon the courage to buy additional shares. Through this
rebalancing, the gambler is able to grow his capital an asymptotic rate of 5.9% per-
period. Although the buy-and-hold investor has a higher expected final wealth (1.25t
versus 1.125t), he will almost surely underperform the Kelly gambler as t → ∞ (by
an exponential factor). The Kelly gambler achieves this outperformance in spite of
the fact that he is taking only half the risk of the buy-and-hold investor.
Breiman (1961) proved that the Kelly rule asymptotically outperforms any “es-
sentially different strategy,” and that it has a shorter mean waiting time to reach a
distant wealth goal. Inspired by this paper, Edward Thorp (of card-counting fame)
used the Kelly criterion to properly size his bets at the Nevada blackjack tables. He
went on to use log-optimal portfolios as a professional fund manager, in direct compe-
tition with Harry Markowitz, who used his own (1952) theory. This is all discussed in
Thorp (2006). Thorp (1969) critiques the mean-variance theory and gives an example
of a log-optimal portfolio that is not on the mean-variance frontier.
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The stock market is different from a game of blackjack in the sense that the distri-
bution of payoffs (returns) is never actually known a priori. Whereas the distribution
of payoffs on a given hand of blackjack can in principle be computed explicitly from
the rules and structure of the game, the stock market practitioner must specify a
return process and estimate the parameters on the fly.
In an important paper, Cover and Gluss (1986) gave the first trading strategy that
could guarantee, despite ignorance of the return process, to compound its money
at the Kelly asymptotic growth rate. Restricting the return vector to a finite set,
they apply Blackwell’s (1956) approachability theorem to show that the Kelly growth
rate is uniformly asymptotically approachable. In fact, the trader can guarantee to
compound his wealth at the same asymptotic rate as the best rebalancing rule in
hindsight, for all possible market behavior. Their “Empirical Bayes Stock Portfolio”
has three main defects. First, the convergence is slow. Second, the cardinality of the
finite set must be known (or at least bounded) beforehand. Third, the practitioner is
required to solve optimization problems in as many dimensions as there are possible
values of the return vector. Cover’s (1987) survey of log-optimal portfolios gives a
better explanation of the intuition underlying the (1986) paper.
Cover’s aptly-named (1991) “universal portfolio” remedies all these problems with-
out having to restrict the return vector to a finite set. The basic idea is so simple
that its veracity hardly needs a technical proof. Imagine that we have a dollar, and
that we would prefer that this dollar be managed by the Kelly rule, which is some
(unknown) point of the portfolio simplex. In our ignorance, we distribute the dol-
lar uniformly over all the rebalancing rules in the simplex. The amount of money
managed by the portfolios in any region of the simplex is now proportional to the
volume of that region. On account of allocation drift, the portfolios in the vicinity
of the Kelly rule will hold, asymptotically, 100% of the aggregate wealth. Thus, the
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overall wealth (that accrues to the initial one dollar investment) will grow at the
same asymptotic rate as the Kelly rule. Jamshidian (1992) extends the technique to
continuous-time, where stock prices are assumed to follow an Itoˆ process with un-
known drift and diffusion. Helmbold, Schapire, Singer, and Warmuth (1998) give a
finite-memory universal strategy that only needs to remember the portfolio vector
used in the preceding period.
Cover and Ordentlich (1998) give a universal portfolio that is optimized for a
specific investment horizon. They solve a two-person, simultaneous move, zero-sum
game between a trader and nature. The trader picks an entire trading algorithm, and
nature picks the returns of all stocks in all periods. The payoff is the ratio of the
trader’s final wealth to that of the best rebalancing rule in hindsight. Remarkably,
the game is an outgrowth of Shtarkov’s (1987) theory of universal data compression,
which solves a discrete version of the problem. Shtarkov’s theory implies that it is
possible to compress a stream of discrete symbols to the Shannon (entropy) limit, even
when lacking an a priori statistical model of the data. Taking a somewhat ad hoc
(guess-and-verify) approach, Cover and Ordentlich provide a trading strategy that
exactly achieves the lower value of the game. Cover and Thomas’ (2006) textbook
on information theory gives an exposition that is slightly more intelligible than the
(1998) paper.
The aim of the present paper is to put universal portfolios in their most natural
and general setting, as superhedges of a specific type of lookback option, namely, the
final wealth of the best rebalancing rule in hindsight. A superhedge for a derivative
is a self-financing trading strategy, together with an initial deposit of money, that
guarantees to generate final wealth at least as large as the derivative, for all possible
paths of stock prices. Thus, the trading strategy is said to “super-replicate” the
option. The concept is due to Bensaid, Lesne, Pages, and Scheinkman (1991). They
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show that in the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (1979) model, under proportional transaction
costs, it can be cheaper to super-replicate an option than to hedge it exactly.
Any reasonably efficient superhedge of the hindsight-optimized final wealth (vis-a-
vis rebalancing rules) will “beat the market asymptotically” for completely arbitrary
price behavior, provided that the best rebalancing rule in hindsight is able to sustain a
higher asymptotic growth rate than the best performing stock in the market. Accord-
ingly, this paper constructs a theory of “multilinear superhedging” that generalizes
Cover’s universal portfolios. A multilinear trading strategy is one whose final wealth
is linear separately in each period’s gross-return vector. Since every multilinear final
wealth function corresponds to a unique replicating strategy, one can directly choose
the multilinear final wealth that most efficiently super-replicates a given derivative.
For derivatives that are convex and homogeneous in each period’s return vector, there
will exist a unique multilinear superhedge that is cheaper than any other (multilinear
or not). More generally, the paper uses the axiom of choice to show that minimum-
cost superhedges (not necessarily multilinear) exist for all possible derivatives.
2 Stock Market
We take up the general market with m underlying assets (“stocks”) and T discrete
trading sessions, called t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Let Stj be the price of stock j at the close of
session t, where S0j is the initial price of stock j. Let xtj ≥ 0 be the gross-return of a
$1 investment in stock j in session t. The net return is xtj − 1. Thus xtj = Stj/St−1,j
and Stj = S0jx1jx2j · · · xtj, assuming that stock j pays no dividends. More generally,
if each common share of stock j receives a dividend of δtj dollars to the bearer of
record in session t, then xtj = (Stj + δtj)/St−1,j.
We assume that, at the start of session t, it is possible to buy any number of shares
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of stock j at the opening price St−1,j (so long as we can afford it), and thereby partici-
pate fully in the gross return xtj. The portfolio that we buy at the open of session t (=
the close of session t−1) must be held until the open of session t+1, at which time our
holdings in the various stocks will be adjusted. We imagine a completely frictionless
situation with no market impact, taxes, transaction costs, or bid/ask spreads. The
gross-return vector in session t is denoted xt = (xt1, ..., xtj, ..., xtm) ∈ Rm+ − {0}. The
return history after session t is xt = (x1, ..., xt), with transition law x
t+1 = (xt, xt+1).
The empty history is called h0. The set of all return histories (state space) is
H = {h0} ∪
T⋃
t=1
(
Rm+
)t
. In accordance with limited liability, all prices and gross
returns are nonnegative, with the proviso that xt is never the zero vector.
3 Trading strategies
We consider self-financing trading strategies, generally called θ(·). Literally, the strat-
egy finances its asset purchases internally, via the sales of other assets. A self-financing
strategy is not subject to any deposits or withdrawals other than the initial deposit
of money into the strategy.
Thus, a trader deposits $1 into θ(·) at t = 0 and just “lets it ride.” Let θtj ≥ 0
be the fraction of wealth that the trader puts into stock j at the start of session
t, where
m∑
j=1
θtj = 1. Thus θtj = θtj(x1, ..., xt−1) = θtj(xt−1). The trader’s portfolio
vector in session t is denoted θt = (θt1, ..., θtm). For simplicity, we will merely write
θ(x1, ..., xt) ∈ ∆ for the trader’s portfolio in session t + 1. A trading strategy is
a mapping θ : H → ∆ of the return histories into the portfolio simplex, where
∆ = {b ∈ Rm+ :
∑m
j=1 bj = 1}. Thus, θ(h0) is the initial portfolio. A common choice
is θ(h0) = (1/m, ..., 1/m). The set of all trading strategies is denoted Θ = ∆H. This
set is compact with respect to the product topology.
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In session t, θ(·) multiplies the trader’s wealth by the factor
m∑
j=1
θtj(x
t−1)xtj =
〈θt(xt−1), xt〉, the dot product of the portfolio vector and the return vector. After T
sessions, the trader’s initial dollar has grown into
Wθ(x1, ...., xT ) = 〈θ(h0), x1〉〈θ(x1), x2〉 · · · 〈θ(x1, ..., xT−1), xT 〉. (1)
This equation formalizes the fact that θ(·) is self-financing. Wθ(·) is called the final
wealth function induced by θ.
Proposition 1. If W (x1, ..., xT ) = Wθ is a feasible final wealth function, then
∑
(j1,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T
W (ej1 , ..., ejT ) = 1 , (2)
where ek denotes the k
th unit basis vector for Rm, and the sum is taken over all
possible unit basis vectors ej1 , ..., ejT .
Proof. We start by writing W (ej1 , ..., ejT ) = W (ej1 , ..., ejT−1)〈θ(ej1 , ..., ejT−1), ejT 〉 and
summing both sides over jT = 1, ...,m. Since the coordinates of any portfolio vector
sum to 1, we get
m∑
jT=1
W (ej1 , ..., ejT ) = W (ej1 , ..., ejT−1). By induction on T , when we
sum both sides of this last equation over all (j1, ..., jT−1) ∈ {1, ...,m}T−1, we get 1,
which is the desired result. The base case states that
m∑
j1=1
〈θ(h0), ej1〉 = 1, which is
true since the coordinates of the initial portfolio vector sum to 1.
Proposition 2. The mapping θ 7→ Wθ is continuous with respect to the product
topology. Thus, the set of all feasible final wealth functions (that accrue to an initial
$1 deposit) is a compact subset of RR
mT
+
+ .
Proof. Suppose that θ(·) is a given trading strategy, xT = (x1, ..., xT ) is a given (fixed)
return history, and  is a given positive number. We must find a neighborhood U of
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θ such that for all trading strategies ψ(·) in this neighborhood, |Wψ(xT )−Wθ(xT )| <
. Since polynomials are continuous, there exists a neighborhood G of the vector
(θ(h0), θ(x1), ..., θ(xT−1)) in ∆T such that, for all (b1, b2, ..., bT ) ∈ G, we have
|〈b1, x1〉 · · · 〈bT , xT 〉−Wθ(xT )| < . Setting U = {ψ ∈ Θ : (ψ(h0), ψ(x1), ..., ψ(xT−1)) ∈
G} gives the desired result.
Example 1. A buy-and-hold strategy makes some initial distribution of wealth among
the stocks and then “lets it ride.” It induces a final wealth function of the form
Wθ(x1, ..., xT ) =
m∑
j=1
{
cj
T∏
t=1
xtj
}
, (3)
where cj is the initial fraction of wealth put into stock j.
Definition 1. A constant rebalancing rule is a strategy θ(xt) = c = (c1, ..., cm) ∈
∆ that keeps a constant fraction of wealth cj in each stock.
The rebalancing rule c multiplies the trader’s wealth by 〈c, xt〉 in session t, and
induces the final wealth function
Wc(x1, ..., xT ) = 〈c, x1〉〈c, x2〉 · · · 〈c, xT 〉. (4)
A rebalancing rule is not a buy-and-hold strategy. At the start of session t, the trader
puts the fraction cj of his wealth into each stock j, and his portfolio is balanced. At
the end of session t, just after xt has been realized, he suddenly has the fraction
cjxtj/〈c, xt〉 of his wealth in stock j. The trader is now overweight stock j if xtj >
〈c, xt〉, otherwise he is underweight stock j. The portfolio must be rebalanced again
at the start of session t + 1. After each fluctuation, the rebalancing rule c dictates
that he sell some shares of the stocks that outperformed the portfolio, and put the
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proceeds into the stocks that underperformed the portfolio. Thus, a rebalancing rule
will generally trade every period. A rebalancing rule c is called degenerate if c = ej
is some unit basis vector. A degenerate rule keeps 100% of wealth in stock j at all
times, and so it just amounts to buying and holding stock j.
Definition 2. If the xt are independent and identically distributed, then the Kelly
rebalancing rule is defined by
c∗ = argmax
c∈∆
E[log 〈c, xt〉]. (5)
The number γ∗ = Max
c∈∆
E[log 〈c, xt〉] is called the Kelly asymptotic growth rate.
By its very definition, the Kelly rule maximizes the expected per-period contin-
uously compounded capital growth rate. The Law of Large Numbers implies that
the Kelly gambler’s realized per-period growth rate converges to γ∗ almost surely.
Asymptotically, the Kelly gambler has (exponentially) more wealth than any gambler
that follows an “essentially different” strategy, and he has the shortest mean wait-
ing time to reach a distant wealth goal (Breiman 1961). More generally, we have the
conditionally log-optimal trading strategy θ(xt−1) = argmax
c∈∆
E[log 〈c, xt〉|xt−1],
which is asymptotically dominant against a (known) ergodic stationary return process
(Cover and Thomas 2006).
The set of all trading strategies is convex, it being the product of convex sets. The
convex combination λθ(xt) + (1 − λ)ψ(xt) amounts to maintaining a fixed fraction
of wealth in each of the two trading strategies θ and ψ. For, the gross-return of
the strategy in session t + 1 is 〈λθ(xt) + (1 − λ)ψ(xt), xt+1〉 = λ〈θ(xt), xt+1〉 + (1 −
λ)〈ψ(xt), xt+1〉, which amounts to handing the fraction λ of wealth over to θ(·) and
(1− λ) over to ψ(·) at the start of each trading session.
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4 Derivatives
We take up the most general derivative security, which pays off an amountD(x1, ..., xT )
at the close of session T . The derivative is written (created and sold) by a primary-
dealer at t = 0. At each date thereafter, D is traded on the secondary market
alongside the m stocks. Note that in each session we have a continuum of possible
outcomes xt ∈ Rm+ , so that D is not generally a redundant asset.
Definition 3. A derivative D(x1, ..., xT ) is called multilinear if it is linear separately
in each vector xt. It is called multiconvex if it is convex separately in each xt.
Proposition 3. If D is convex and positively homogeneous separately in each vec-
tor xt (equivalently, subadditive and positively homogeneous in each xt), then D is
majorized by the multilinear derivative
D ≤
∑
(j1,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T
D(ej1 , ..., ejT )x1j1x2j2 · · · xTjT . (6)
Proof. By subadditivity and homogeneity, we have
D(x1, ..., xT ) = D(x
T−1, xT1e1 + · · ·+xTmem) ≤
m∑
jT=1
D(xT−1, ejT )xTjT . By induction,
we can majorize D(xT−1, ejT ) by
∑
(j1,...,jT−1)∈{1,...,m}T−1
D(ej1 , ..., ejT )x1j1x2j2 ···xT−1,jT−1 ,
and the result follows. For T = 1, the proposition says that D(x1) ≤
m∑
j1=1
D(ej1)x1j1 ,
which is true by subadditivity and homogeneity.
Example 2. The final wealth function of every rebalancing rule and of every buy-
and-hold strategy is a multilinear derivative.
Example 3. Consider the strategy that follows the c−rebalancing rule, but only re-
balances the portfolio every τ periods. The final wealth function of this strategy is a
multilinear derivative.
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Multilinear stock indexes
Example 4. The general price-weighted (e.g. Dow Jones) index has the form D =
λ(St1 + St2 + · · · + Stm), where λ is a scale factor chosen for convenience. This is
multilinear, since Stj is a multilinear function of the return data. To replicate the
index, simply buy λ shares of each stock, and hold. The replicating strategy is the
price-weighted portfolio vector θ(xt) = (St1, ..., Stm)/
m∑
j=1
Stj.
Example 5. The general capitalization-weighted index (e.g. S&P 500) has the form
D = λ(n1St1 +n2St2 + · · ·+nmStm), where nj is the number of shares firm j has out-
standing. To replicate the index, buy λnj shares of each firm j, and hold. The replicat-
ing strategy is the capitalization-weighted portfolio vector θ(xt) = (n1St1, ..., nmStm)/
m∑
j=1
njStj.
Example 6. An equal-weight index1 is defined by the uniform rebalancing rule c =
(1/m, ..., 1/m). It has the form
D = λ
T∏
t=1
{
1
m
m∑
j=1
xtj
}
= λm−T 〈1, x1〉〈1, x2〉 · · · 〈1, xT 〉. (7)
Lookback options
Example 7 (Perfect Trader). Suppose you knew the future price charts of all stocks
in advance. Each period, you would put all your money into the stock with the highest
gross-return. Your growth factor in session t would be Max
1≤j≤m
xtj = ||xt||∞. Your final
wealth would be D = ||x1||∞||x2||∞ · · · ||xT ||∞, where || · ||∞ is the infinity norm.
Example 8 (Perfect Buy-and-Hold Investor). Suppose you knew the single best per-
forming stock in advance. You would put all your money into that stock, and hold.
1The leading equal-weight ETFs (from Guggeinheim) are only rebalanced quarterly. These in-
dexes are still multilinear if, say, the length of a trading session is one second, minute, hour, day,
week, month, etc.
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Your final wealth would be D = Max
1≤j≤m
T∏
t=1
xtj.
Example 9. Suppose you know the entire price chart of a certain stock j in advance.
You know the single best period s to buy and the best time t to sell. The profit from
the single shrewdest trade on 1 ≤ t ≤ T is Max
1≤s≤t≤T
{
Stj − Ssj
}
.
Example 10 (Cover’s Derivative). For the return path x1, ..., xT , the best rebalanc-
ing rule in hindsight is argmax
c∈∆
〈c, x1〉〈c, x2〉 · · · 〈c, xT 〉. The hindsight-optimized
final wealth is D(x1, ..., xT ) = Max
c∈∆
〈c, x1〉〈c, x2〉 · · · 〈c, xT 〉.
Definition 4. A derivative D(x1, ..., xT ) is said to be perfectly hedgeable (or repli-
cable) iff there is a self-financing trading strategy θ(·) and an initial deposit p such
that D = p·Wθ for all x1, ..., xT . This (necessarily unique) θ is called the hedging (or
replicating) strategy corresponding to D(·). The (unique) initial deposit p = p∗[D]
is called the hedging cost.
Proposition 4. If D(·) is exactly hedgeable, then the hedging cost is given by the lin-
ear functional p∗[D] =
∑
(j1,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ) . The unique replicating strat-
egy is
θk(x
t) =
Σ
(jt+2,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T−t−1
D(xt, ek, ejt+2 , ..., ejT )
Σ
(jt+1,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T−t
D(xt, ejt+1 , ..., ejT )
, (8)
where θk(x
t) denotes the kth coordinate of θ(xt).
Assuming that D = p ·Wθ can be hedged perfectly, the unique replicating strategy
is derived as follows. Start with
〈θ(xt), xt+1〉 = Wθ(xt+1)/Wθ(xt), (9)
and substitute xt+1 = ej. This gives θj(x
t) = Wθ(x
t, ej)/Wθ(x
t). Summing over j,
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we get Wθ(x
t) =
m∑
j=1
Wθ(x
t, ej). Applying this last formula repeatedly, one gets the
formulas
Wθ(x
t) = Σ
(jt+1,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T−t
Wθ(x
t, ejt+1 , ..., ejT ) (10)
θk(x
t) =
Σ
(jt+2,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T−t−1
D(xt, ek, ejt+2 , ..., ejT )
Σ
(jt+1,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T−t
D(xt, ejt+1 , ..., ejT )
(11)
In general, the above formula for θ(·) in terms of D(·) may well be an extraneous
solution of the functional equation D/p = Wθ. Of course, one must substitute the
strategy θ so obtained back into the equation D/p = Wθ, and verify that it is a
solution. This is illustrated below.
Proposition 5. A derivative D(x1, ..., xT ) can be exactly dynamically replicated if
and only if it satisfies the following functional equation, identically for all x1, ..., xT :
T∏
t=1
( Σ
(jt,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T−t+1
D(xt−1, ejt , ..., ejT )xtjt
Σ
(jt,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T−t+1
D(xt−1, ejt , ..., ejT )
)
≡ D(x1, ..., xT )
Σ
(j1,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T
D(ej1 , ..., ejT )
(12)
Corollary 1. If D(x1, ..., xT ) ≥ 0 is a multilinear form, e.g. it is linear separately in
each vector argument xt, then D can be replicated exactly.
To see this, we can write D(xt−1, ejt , ..., ejT )xtjt = D(x
t−1, xtjtejt , ..., ejT ) on ac-
count of the fact that D is homogeneous separately in each argument. We then sum
this equation over the indices jt = 1, 2, ...,m, and get D(x
t, ejt+1 , ..., ejT ) on account
of the fact that D is additive separately in each vector argument. The product on
the left-hand side of the functional equation is now seen to be telescopic; it collapses
exactly to the ratio given on the right-hand side of the functional equation.
Corollary 2. When restricted to the set of all strictly positive trading strategies
(θ(xt) >> 0), the mapping θ 7→ Wθ is a homeomorphism.
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Proposition 6. The set of all exactly hedgeable derivatives is a closed, convex cone.
If D1 is replicated by θ(·) and D2 is replicated by ψ(·), then the nonnegative
combination λD1 + (1 − λ)D2 can be replicated by depositing λp∗[D1] dollars into
θ(·), and (1−λ)p∗[D2] dollars into ψ(·), and “letting it ride.” Let η(·) be the strategy
that replicates λD1 + (1− λ)D2. Then we have
ηk(x
t) =
λp∗[D1]Wθ(xt)θk(xt) + (1− λ)p∗[D2]Wψ(xt)ψk(xt)
λp∗[D1]Wθ(xt) + (1− λ)p∗[D2]Wψ(xt) . (13)
This is a valid trading strategy, since ηk(x
t) ≥ 0 and
m∑
k=1
ηk(x
t) = 1. A direct calcu-
lation verifies that Wη = λD
1 + (1− λ)D2.
5 Multilinear derivatives
Definition 5. A multilinear trading strategy is one that induces a multilinear
final wealth function.
The general multilinear derivative has the form
D(x1, ..., xT ) = p
∗[D]
∑
j1,...,jT
α(j1, ..., jT )x1j1 · · · xTjT , (14)
where the coefficients α(j1, ..., jT ) are nonnegative and sum to 1. To specify a multi-
linear trading strategy, we just pick the coefficients α(j1, ..., jT ) = D(ej1 , ..., ejT )/p
∗[D]
and work out the implied portfolio vectors θ(xt).
14
Proposition 7. If D(·) is a multilinear derivative, then the replicating strategy is
θk(x
t) =
Σ
(j1,...,jt,jt+2,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T−1
D(ej1 , ..., ejt , ek, ejt+2 , ..., ejT )x1j1x2j2 · · · xtjt
Σ
(j1,...,jT )∈{1,...,m}T
D(ej1 , ..., ejT )x1j1x2j2 · · · xtjt
.
(15)
The denominator is just the sum of the numerators for k = 1, ...,m. The numer-
ators are multilinear functions of the return data (x1, ..., xt). In the k
th numerator,
the coefficient of the product x1j1 · · · xtjt is given by
α(j1, ..., jt) = Σ
jt+2,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejt , ek, ejt+2 , ..., ejT ). (16)
5.1 Extremal strategies
Definition 6. A trading strategy is extreme (or an extreme point) iff θ(xt) is
always some unit basis vector. A strategy is memoryless iff each period’s portfo-
lio vector depends only on the time (and not the history). A strategy that is both
memoryless and extreme is called an extremal strategy.
Each period, an extreme strategy puts all of its wealth into some stock j∗(xt),
which represents the strategy’s guess as to what the best performing stock will be. An
extreme trading strategy induces a final wealth function of the form
T∏
t=1
xtj∗(xt−1). We
will restrict our attention to memoryless extreme strategies. A memoryless extreme
strategy is characterized by a tuple jT = (j1, ..., jT ) ∈ {1, ...,m}T . In session t, the
strategy puts all of its money into stock jt, and has final wealth
T∏
t=1
xtjt .
Proposition 8. The set of multilinear derivatives is the conic hull of the set of (mT )
extreme, memoryless strategies.
15
There is a very intuitive way to understand the replication of the general multilin-
ear payoff
∑
jT
α(jT )x1j1 · · ·xTjT . We take the initial dollar and distribute it among the
mT memoryless, extreme strategies, and just “let it ride.” We put the fraction α(jT )
of wealth into strategy jT . After T periods, the initial deposit into jT has grown to
α(jT )x1j1 · · · xTjT , and thus the aggregate wealth is
∑
jT
α(jT )x1j1 · · · xTjT .
With this idea in mind, it becomes simple to recover the replicating strategy,
without having to memorize any formulas. After t periods, the overall wealth of the
strategy is ∑
jT
α(jT )x1j1 · · · xtjt . (17)
How much money does the composite strategy put into stock k in session t+ 1? We
must look at the extremals of the form (j1, ..., jt, k, jt+2, ..., jT ) that put all money
into stock k in session t+ 1. In aggregate, these strategies have put
∑
j1,...,jt,jt+2,...,jT
α(j1, ..., jt, k, jt+2, ..., jT )x1j1 · · · xtjt (18)
dollars into stock k in session t+ 1. Thus, the total fraction of wealth put into stock
k in session t+ 1 is
θk(x
t) =
∑
j1,...,jt,jt+2,...,jT
α(j1, ..., jt, k, jt+2, ..., jT )x1j1 · · · xtjt∑
jT
α(jT )x1j1 · · · xtjt
. (19)
5.2 Symmetric multilinear strategies
We can think of the extremal strategy jT = (j1, ..., jT ) as a certain “expert” who in
period t recommends that we put all our money into stock jt. Arbitrary multilinear
strategies can be difficult to compute in practice, since there are so many experts to
account for (e.g. the sums have an exponential number of terms).
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Definition 7. A multilinear trading strategy is called symmetric if the induced
final wealth function W (x1, ..., xT ) is symmetric with respect to the vector arguments
x1, ..., xT , e.g. W (x1, ..., xT ) = W (xσ(1), xσ(2), ...., xσ(T )) for any permutation σ of the
indices 1, 2, ..., T .
A symmetric multilinear strategy is characterized by the fact that the numeri-
cal values of the coefficients α(j1, ..., jT ) do not depend on the order of the indices
j1, ..., jT .
Definition 8. Let nk be the number of k
′s that appear among the indices j1, ..., jT .
The counts (n1, ..., nm) constitute the type of the expert j
T = (j1, ..., jT ), where nk ≥ 0
and
m∑
k=1
nk = T .
For a symmetric multilinear strategy, the coefficients α(jT ) depend only on the
type of jT , and we can write α(n1, ..., nm). Two experts j
T and kT are called
equivalent, and we write jT ∼ kT , if they have the same type. This relation de-
composes the set of experts into type classes. The type class of (n1, ..., nm) has(
T
n1,n2,···,nm
)
= T !/(n1!n2! · · · nm!) experts. There are as many type classes as there
are solutions of the equation n1 +n2 + · · ·+nm = T in nonnegative integers, namely,(
m+T−1
m−1
)
.
Note than in addition to being simple, the symmetric multilinear strategies have a
certain robustness in the sense that a mere reordering of the return vectors x1, ..., xT
cannot change the final wealth.
In the initial distribution of money, a total of
(
T
n1,n2,···,nm
)
α(n1, ..., nm) is given to
the experts in type class (n1, ..., nm). Thus, we must have
∑
n1+···+nm=T
(
T
n1, n2, · · ·, nm
)
α(n1, ..., nm) = 1. (20)
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Example 11. α(n1, ..., nm) = λn
n1
1 n
n2
2 · · · nnmm , where λ =
{
Σ
n1+...+nm=T
(
T
n1,...,nm
)
nn11 ·
· · nnmm
}−1
. This is the prior distribution in Cover and Ordentlich’s (1998) universal
portfolio.
Example 12. α(n1, ..., nm) = λn1!n2! · · · nm!, where λ =
{
Σ
n1+...+nm=T
(
T
n1,...,nm
)
n1! ·
· · nm!
}−1
=
{(
m+T−1
m−1
)
T !
}−1
. Thus α(n1, ..., nm) =
{(
m+T−1
m−1
)(
T
n1,...,nm
)}−1
. This is
the prior distribution in Cover’s (1991) universal portfolio. This multilinear strategy
characterized by the fact that it distributes an equal amount of money into each type
class.
5.2.1 Simplification of θk(x
t)
For a symmetric multilinear trading strategy, the numerator of θk(x
t) can be simplified
as follows. Let α(jt, k) = Σ
jt+1,...,jT
α(jt, k, jt+1, ..., jT ) be the marginal pmf obtained
from α by summing over the coordinates jt+1, ..., jT . This number depends only on k
and the type (N1, ..., Nm) of j
t, where N1 + · · · + Nm = t. In fact, if jt has type N ,
then α(jt, k) is equal to
Σ
n1+···+nm=T−t−1
(
T − t− 1
n1, ..., nm
)
α(N1 + n1, ..., Nk + nk + 1, , ..., Nm + nm). (21)
Denote this number by αtk(N1, ..., Nm). We then have
Σ
jt
α(jt, k)x1j1 · · · xtjt = Σ
N1+···+Nm=t
αtk(N) Σ
jt has typeN
x1j1 · · · xtjt . (22)
Let σ(N1, ..., Nm;x
t) denote the number Σ
jt has typeN
x1j1 · · · xtjt . Effective calculation
of the numerator of θk(x
t) thus can be broken into three parts:
1. Calculate σ(N1, ..., Nm;x
t) by a recursive method
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2. Calculate αtk(N) by a recursive method (if α(·) allows) or else by direct sum-
mation
3. Explicitly add all the terms in
Σ
N1+···+Nm=t
αtk(N)σ(N ;x
t) (23)
A recurrence for σ(N ;xt) is derived as follows. σ(N ;xt) =
m∑
k=1
{
Σ
jt−1 has type (N1,...,Nk−1,...,Nm)
x1j1 · · · xt−1,jt−1
}
xtk =
Σmk=1σ(N1, ..., Nk − 1, ..., Nm)xtk
= Σmk=1σ(N1, ..., Nk − 1, ..., Nm;xt−1)xtk. (24)
The recursion gradually reduces the numbers N1, ..., Nm until one of them (say, the
kth) is 1 and the rest are 0. The boundary conditions are then
σ(0, ..., 1
k
, ..., 0;x1) = x1k. (25)
Thus, calculating σ(N ;xt) requires m recursive calls, and the recursion tree is t − 1
levels deep. One is required to calculate all the numbers σ(r1, ..., rN ;x
t) for which
rk ≥ 0 and 1 ≤ r1 + · · · + rm ≤ t − 1. This amounts to calculating and storing
t−1∑
s=1
(
s+m−1
m−1
)
= O(tm) numbers, which is possible for small values of m. A direct recur-
sive implementation should not be attempted, as the recursion tree will involve enor-
mous duplication. Rather, the numbers σ(r1, ..., rN ;x
t) should be tabulated according
to the “bottom up” approach. At step s, we tabulate all the numbers σ(r1, ..., rN ;x
t)
for which r1 + · · · + rN = s, making use of all the numbers tabulated in step s − 1.
Once step s is completed, the numbers tabulated in step s − 1 no longer need to be
stored.
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6 Superhedging
Definition 9. A superhedge for D is a pair (p, θ), where θ(·) is a self-financing
trading strategy and p is an initial deposit, such that p ·Wθ(x1, ..., xT ) ≥ D(x1, ..., xT )
for all x1, ..., xT .
Definition 10. The superhedging price of D is
inf
{
p : (p, θ) is a superhedge for some θ
}
. If no superhedge exists, then the super-
hedging price is +∞.
Proposition 9. The superhedging price of any derivative D is at least
∑
j1,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ).
If D is exactly hedgeable, then the superhedging price is equal to the hedging cost.
Proof. In the defining inequality p ·Wθ(x1, ..., xT ) ≥ D(x1, ..., xT ), substitute xt = ejt
and sum both sides over all possible unit basis vectors ej1 , ..., ejT . Using Proposition
1, we see that
∑
j1,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ) is a lower bound for the set of all monetary deposits
p that form a part of some superhedge (p, θ).
Thus, it is appropriate to write p∗[D] for the superhedging price. We have ex-
tended the functional p∗[D] from the set of all exactly hedgeable derivatives to the
set of all derivatives.
Proposition 10. The functional p∗[D] ≥ 0 is subadditive, positively homogeneous
(hence convex), and increasing in D. If θ(·) is a trading strategy, then p∗[Wθ] = 1.
Theorem 1. If a superhedge exists at all, then there is a superhedge that costs exactly
p∗[D]. Thus, “inf” can be replaced with “min” in the definition of superhedging price.
Proof. Suppose a superhedge exists that costs p. By the definition of p∗ = p∗[D],
there is a sequence of superhedges (pn, θ
(n)) such that pn ≤ p and lim
n→∞
pn = p
∗[D].
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Define a trading strategy ψ(·) as follows. Fix a particular return path x1, ..., xT . Then
(
pn, θ
(n)(h0), θ(n)(x1), θ
(n)(x1, x2), ..., θ
(n)(x1, ..., xT )
)
(26)
is a sequence of points from the compact set [0, p] × ∆T+1. It has a convergent
subsequence. Pick any subsequential limit. It has the form
(
p∗[D], ψ(h0), ψ(x1), ψ(x1, x2), ..., ψ(x1, ..., xT )
)
. (27)
This serves to define ψ(·) along the particular path x1, ..., xT . Taking the chosen
subsequential limit of the inequality
pn
T∏
t=1
〈θ(n)(xt−1), xt〉 ≥ D(x1, ..., xT ), (28)
we get p∗[D] ·Wψ(x1, ..., xT ) ≥ D(x1, ..., xT ). This holds good on any particular path
x1, ..., xT .
Remark 1. Notice how the axiom of choice entered into the above proof. For each par-
ticular return path x1, ..., xT , we had to make an arbitrary choice from the (nonempty)
set of subsequential limits of a certain sequence that depended on x1, ..., xT .
This theorem can be proved another way. We consider the problem of minimizing
p over the set of all (p, θ) ∈ [0, p] × Θ such that (p, θ) is a superhedge for D. This
amounts to minimizing a continuous function over a compact set. The function
(p, θ) 7→ p is of course continuous with respect to the product topology. We need only
show that the domain is a closed subset of the (compact) set [0, p]×Θ. The domain is
defined by a continuum of inequalities, p ·Wθ(x1, ..., xT ) ≥ D(x1, ..., xT ) for all paths
(x1, ..., xT ). Since θ 7→ Wθ is continuous, each such inequality defines a certain closed
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subset of [0, p]×Θ. The intersection of any number of closed sets is a closed set.
Theorem 2. If D is subadditive and positively homogeneous separately in each xt,
then its superhedging price is exactly
∑
j1,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ). There is a unique multilin-
ear superhedge that achieves the minimum cost.
Proof. In the inequality
D ≤
∑
j1,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejT )x1j1 · · · xTjT , (29)
the right-hand side is a multilinear superhedge whose cost achieves the lower bound∑
j1,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ). This proves that p
∗[D] =
∑
j1,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ). To show unique-
ness, assume that p∗[D]
∑
jT
α(jT )x1j1 ···xTjT is a minimum-cost multilinear superhedge.
In the definition of a superhedge, make the substitutions x1 = ej1 , x2 = ej2 , ..., xT =
ejT . We get
p∗[D]α(jT ) ≥ D(ej1 , ..., ejT ), (30)
so that α(jT ) ≥ D(ej1 , ..., ejT )/p∗[D] for all jT . On account of the fact that
∑
jT
α(jT ) =
1, this forces α(jT ) = D(ej1 , ..., ejT )/p
∗[D] for all jT .
7 Solution of the generalized max-min game
Cover and Ordentlich (1998) used the concrete performance benchmarkD(x1, ..., xT ) =
Max
c∈∆
T∏
t=1
〈c, xt〉, which is the final wealth of the best rebalancing rule in hindsight.
They formulated a two-person, simultaneous-move, zero-sum game between the trader
and “nature,” whereby the trader picks a strategy θ(·) and nature picks the return
path (x1, ..., xT ). In what follows, we will use the convenient notation X = (x1, ..., xT )
to denote the matrix of gross-returns of all stocks in all periods.
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We take up the payoff kernel (θ(·), X) 7→ Wθ(X)/D(X). That is, the trader picks
θ(·) so as to maximize the relative performance measure Wθ(X)/D(X), and nature
picks X so as to minimize it. In this section, we solve the game for any multiconvex
benchmark D(·) that is positively homogeneous separately in each xt. This means
that the benchmark is also subadditive separately in each xt.
Theorem 3. For any positive derivative D(x1, ..., xT ), the lower value v[D] (in pure
strategies) of the generalized max-min game is
v[D] = 1/p∗[D] = max
θ(·)
inf
x1,...,xT∈Rm+−{0}
Wθ(X)
D(X)
. (31)
The max is always achieved exactly (by any minimum-cost superhedge). The upper
value in pure strategies is
v[D] = inf
x1,...,xT
||x1||∞ · · · ||xT ||∞
D(X)
, (32)
where the numerator is the payoff of the perfect-trader option.
Proof. Let θ(·) be a minimum-cost superhedge for D(·). First, we show that θ guaran-
tees a payoff ≥ 1/p∗[D] for all X. By definition, p∗[D]Wθ ≥ D for all possible return
paths x1, ..., xT . Thus, Wθ(X)/D(X) ≥ 1/p∗[D] regardless of nature’s choice. Next,
we show that 1/p∗[D] is the best possible guarantee. Let g be a payoff guarantee
corresponding to some trading strategy ψ(·). Then, since Wψ(X)/D(X) ≥ g for all
X, we have (1/g)Wψ ≥ D on all possible return paths. Since (1/g, ψ) is a superhedge
for D, by definition we must have p∗[D] ≤ 1/g. Thus, since g ≤ 1/p∗[D], 1/p∗[D] is
indeed the best possible payoff the trader can guarantee.
For the upper value, just note that when calculating inf
X
max
θ
Wθ(X)/D(X), the
trading strategy θ is selected with full prior knowledge of all returns. Given this
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knowledge, the trader can cherry-pick a strategy that, in every period t, puts all its
money into the best performing stock j∗(X, t) = argmax
1≤j≤m
xtj. Thus, the best response
to a given X is the trading strategy θ(xt−1) = ej∗(X,t). This yields a final wealth of
T∏
t=1
||xt||∞.
Corollary 3. If D(X) ≤
T∏
t=1
||xt||∞ is majorized by the perfect-trader option, and
p∗[D] > 1, then there is a duality gap v[D] < v[D], and thus there is no pure-strategy
equilibrium.
Note that any derivative D that deserves to be called a “lookback” must obviously
have a super-replicating cost higher than 1 (on account of the hindsight-optimization)
and have a payoff no greater than that of the perfect-trader (who hindsight-optimizes
over all possible trading strategies)1. Since there will be a duality gap whenever D is
a lookback option, we must resort to randomized strategies to solve the game.
Theorem 4. If D(·) is multiconvex and homogeneous separately in each xt, then in
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, the trader uses the unique minimum-cost multi-
linear superhedge and nature randomizes over the set of Kelly sequences
{
(ej1 , ..., ejT ) :
(j1, ..., jT ) ∈ {1, ...,m}T
}
according to the probabilities P
{
X = (ej1 , ..., ejT )
}
=
D(ej1 , ..., ejT )/p
∗[D]. The value of the game is 1/p∗[D].
Proof. First, we note that this is a legitimate assignment of probabilities, since∑
j1,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ) = p
∗[D], on account of the multiconvexity and multi-homogeneity.
Next, let θ be a minimum-cost superhedge for D. Since θ achieves the lower value of
the game in pure strategies, we have Wθ(X)/D(X) ≥ 1/p∗[D] for all X. Thus, we
have E[Wθ(X)/D(X)] ≥ 1/p∗[D], where the expectation is taken with respect to the
1In a separate working paper, we use Zorn’s Lemma to construct the general representation
D(X) = sup
θ∈T
Wθ(X) of such derivatives, where T is the set of trading strategies over which the
hindsight optimization occurs.
24
distribution of the random matrix X. Hence, θ guarantees that the expected payoff
is ≥ 1/p∗[D].
Finally, we show that nature’s randomization guarantees an expected payoff ≤
1/p∗[D]. In fact, it guarantees that the expected payoff is exactly 1/p∗[D], for all θ:
E[Wθ(X)/D(X)] =
∑
j1,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejT )
p∗[D]
× Wθ(ej1 , ..., ejT )
D(ej1 , ..., ejT )
=
1
p∗[D]
∑
j1,...,jT
Wθ(ej1 , ..., ejT ) =
1
p∗[D]
.
(33)
7.1 Cover-Ordentlich preferences for general benchmarks
The remarks in this subsection do not require that D(·) be multi-convex or multi-
homogeneous. Note that any minimum-cost superhedge θ for D will saturate a certain
type of variational preferences over trading strategies. On account of the homeomor-
phism between (strictly positive) trading strategies and final wealth functions, we can
just as well select the optimum feasible final wealth function W (x1, ..., xT ), and then
recover the (unique) implied trading strategy. Define the utility
U [W ] = inf
(x1,...,xT )∈P
W (x1, ..., xT )
D(x1, ..., xT )
, (34)
where P is some set of return paths.
Proposition 11. For all (e.g. even non-measurable) positive performance bench-
marks D(·), the Cover-Ordentlich functional W 7→ U [W ] is increasing, concave, and
upper semi-continuous. It thus has a maximum over the (compact) set of feasible
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final wealth functions, and the set of maximizers is convex. In particular, the set of
minimum-cost superhedges for a given derivative is nonempty and convex.
Proof. For monotonicity, suppose that W 1 ≤ W 2. Then, taking inf of both sides
of the inequality W 1(X)/D(X) ≤ W 2(X)/D(X), we obtain U [W 1] ≤ U [W 2]. For
concavity, we have
U [λW 1 + (1− λ)W 2] = inf
X∈P
{
λ
W 1(X)
D(X)
+ (1− λ)W
2(X)
D(X)
}
≥ inf
X∈P
{
λ
W 1(X)
D(X)
}
+ inf
X∈P
{
(1− λ)W
2(X)
D(X)
}
= λU [W 1] + (1− λ)U [W 2].
(35)
As to upper-semicontinuity, we will show that the upper contour sets
Cα = {W ∈ W : U [W ] ≥ α} are all closed. Here W denotes the set of feasible final
wealth functions and α is any real number. We have
Cα =
{
W ∈ W : inf
X∈P
W (X)
D(X)
≥ α
}
=
⋂
X∈P
{
W ∈ W : W (X) ≥ αD(X)}. (36)
Thus, Cα is closed because it is an intersection of closed sets. For any given X, the
set
{
W ∈ W : W (X) ≥ αD(X)} is closed because it is the preimage of the closed
set [αD(X),∞) under the continuous (projection) mapping W 7→ W (X).
8 Specialization to Cover and Ordentlich (1998)
We now apply the foregoing theory to Cover’s Derivative,
D(x1, ..., xT ) = Max
c∈∆
〈c, x1〉〈c, x2〉 · · · 〈c, xT 〉. (37)
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Proposition 12. Cover’s Derivative is symmetric, multiconvex, and positvely homo-
geneous separately in each xt. It is increasing in each variable xtj. If 1 is a vector of
ones, then D(x1, ..., xT−1,1) = D(x1, ..., xT−1).
Proof. These properties all follow easily from the definition of Cover’s Derivative.
Note that D(xt, x−t) is convex in xt because it is the maximum of a family of functions
that are all linear in xt.
Proposition 13. The final wealth of the best rebalancing rule in hindsight beats a
Kelly gambler and, in fact, all rebalancing rules, all buy-and-hold strategies, and all
passive indexes.
This is just the plain English manifestation of the following inequalities:
m∑
j=1
cj
{ T∏
t=1
xtj
}
≤ Max
1≤j≤m
{ T∏
t=1
xtj
}
≤ D(x1, ..., xT ). (38)
If the xt are drawn iid from some cumulative distribution function F (·), then the
Kelly rebalancing rule c∗[F ] ∈ argmin
c∈∆
EF [log 〈c, xt〉] will obviously (by definition)
yield less final wealth than the best rebalancing rule in hindsight.
Proposition 14. For Cover’s Derivative, the special values D(ej1 , ..., ejT ) can be
evaluated in closed form. Let nk be the number of times jt = k among the indices
(j1, ..., jT ). Then
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ) =
m∏
k=1
(nk/T )
nk , (39)
where we use the convention 00 = 1.
Proof. This is a standard Cobb-Douglas optimization problem over the unit simplex:
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ) = Max
c∈∆
cn11 c
n2
2 · · · cnmm . (40)
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The solution is c∗k = nk
/ m∑
j=1
nj = nk/T .
Proposition 15. If p(T,m) denotes the superhedging cost of Cover’s Derivative, then
p(T,m) =
∑
n1+···+nm=T
(
T
n1, ..., nm
) m∏
k=1
(nk/T )
nk . (41)
Example 13. For m = 2 stocks, the superhedging cost is
p(T, 2) =
T∑
j=0
(
T
j
)
(j/T )j((T − j)/T )T−j (42)
= 2
dT
2
e−1∑
j=0
(
T
j
)
(j/T )j((T − j)/T )T−j + 1{T is even}
(
T
T/2
)
2−T . (43)
Proposition 16. The superhedging price p(T,m) of Cover’s Derivative is increasing
in both the horizon T and the number of stocks, m.
Proof. We can decompose the superhedging cost into p(T,m) =
∑
(terms for which
nm = 0)+
∑
(terms for which nm > 0)= p(T,m − 1) +
∑
(terms for which nm > 0).
Thus, p(T,m) > p(T,m− 1). To show that the superhedging cost is increasing in T ,
we use the fact that D is subadditive separately in each xt. We have
p(T,m) =
∑
j1,...,jT
D(ej1 , ..., ejT ,1) ≤
∑
j1,...,jT
m∑
k=1
D(ej1 , ..., ejT , ek) = p(T + 1,m), (44)
where we have substituted 1 =
m∑
k=1
ek and used subadditivity.
Proposition 17. On account of the simple bound p(T,m) ≤ (T+m−1
m−1
)
= O(Tm−1),
we have lim
T→∞
log(p(T,m))/T = 0.
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8.1 Excess growth rate of the hindsight-optimized rebalanc-
ing rule
The quantity log(D(xT ))/T is the per-period continuously-compounded capital growth
rate achieved by the best rebalancing rule in hindsight. We compare this with
log(Wθ(x
T ))/T , the growth rate achieved by the trading strategy θ(·).
Definition 11. A family of horizon−T trading strategies θ(xt;T ) is called universal
iff for every  > 0, there is a sufficiently long horizon T on which
log D(x1, ..., xT )− log Wθ(x1, ..., xT ) ≤ T (45)
for all x1, ..., xT .
This means that for every spread tolerance , on a long enough horizon, the excess
per-period continuously-compounded capital growth rate of the best rebalancing rule
in hindsight over and above that of the algorithmic trader is at most , regardless of
the return path of the stock market. Thus, a universal strategy compounds its money
at the same asymptotic rate as the best rebalancing rule in hindsight.
Proposition 18. If θ(xt;T ) is a minimum-cost superhedge for Cover’s Derivative on
a T−period horizon, then the family of strategies θ(xt;T ) is universal.
To prove this, we just take logs of the defining inequality p(T,m)·Wθ ≥ D, and use
the fact that lim
T→∞
log(p(T,m))/T = 0. In fact, even superhedges more costly than
p(T,m) can be universal, provided that the required initial deposit grows to infinity at
a sub-exponential rate. This is true of Cover’s (1991) horizon-free universal portfolio.
Corollary 4. If the xt are drawn iid from some distribution known to the Kelly
gambler (but not to the universal trader), then the Kelly gambler’s excess per-period
growth rate can be made arbitrarily small, given a long enough time horizon.
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This follows from the fact that a Kelly gambler uses a certain rebalancing rule (the
Kelly rule), which by definition yields no more final wealth than the best rebalancing
rule in hindsight. Thus, the excess growth rate of the Kelly bettor is no more than
the excess growth rate of the best rebalancing rule in hindsight, which can be made
arbitrarily small.
8.2 Beating the market asymptotically
On the one hand, a universal trading strategy compounds its money at the same
asymptotic rate as the best rebalancing rule in hindsight. On the other hand, the
best rebalancing rule in hindsight beats the market. However, it would be ridiculous
to claim that a universal strategy yields more final wealth than the S&P 500 on
all return paths. To be quite correct, the realized path must be such that the best
rebalancing rule in hindsight sustains a growth rate that is at least  higher than that
of the S&P 500. For such a return path, on a long enough horizon, a universal trading
strategy will beat the market.
Proposition 19. Any passive index (or any buy-and-hold strategy that owns every
stock in the market) will compound its money at the same asymptotic rate as the best
performing stock in the market, e.g.
lim
T→∞
log
(
Max
1≤j≤m
T∏
t=1
xtj
)
− log
(
m∑
j=1
cj
T∏
t=1
xtj
)
T
= 0, (46)
where the index puts the initial fraction cj > 0 of wealth into stock j, and lets it ride.
Proof. The above quantity is equal to the excess growth rate of the best performing
stock in the market over and above that of the given buy-and-hold portfolio on the
timeframe 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Denoting this quantity by (X), we obviously have (X) ≥ 0
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for all X. Now, let c = Min
1≤j≤m
cj. We have c > 0, since the index is supposed to hold
shares of all stocks. Thus, we have the inequalities 0 ≤ (X) ≤ −log(c)/T for all X
and all T . Since log(c)/T → 0 as T →∞, the result follows.
Proposition 20. A universal trading strategy will beat the market asymptotically by
an exponential factor, provided that the realized returns (xt)
∞
t=1 satisfy the following
(mild) condition:
lim inf
T→∞
log D(x1, ..., xT )− log
(
Max
1≤j≤m
T∏
t=1
xtj
)
T
> 0 (47)
Corollary 5. If the returns (xt)
∞
t=1 are iid and Max
c∈∆
E[log 〈c, xt〉] > Max
1≤j≤m
E[log xtj],
then every universal trading strategy beats the market asymptotically almost surely.
Example 14. In a pairs trading (m = 2) strategy that rebalances annually, on a
horizon of T = 30 years one can guarantee to achieve within 6.7% of the continuously-
compounded annual growth rate of the hindsight-optimized rebalancing rule for the
relevant pair of stocks.
8.3 Practical determination of the horizon
For a given number of stocks m, and a tolerance  for the excess growth rate of the best
rebalancing rule in hindsight, a practitioner is advised to select the smallest horizon
T such that log(p(T,m))/T ≤ . One must try the successive values T = 1, 2, 3, ...,
stopping as soon as log(p(T,m))/T ≤ .
Proposition 21. The superhedging cost p(T,m) can be computed via the recurrence
p(T,m) = 1 +
T−1∑
n=0
(
T
n
)
(n/T )n((T − n)/T )T−np(T − n,m− 1) (48)
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together with the boundary conditions p(1,m) = m and p(T, 1) = 1.
This allows us to tabulate exact values of p(T,m), even for large T andm. To avoid
numerical overflow on the computer, the powers and factorials should be calculated
in log-space, and then exponentiated: exp
{
log
(
T
n
)
+ n log n+ (T − n) log (T − n)−
T log T
}
. For large T and m this will require the calculation of an enormous number
of logarithms. Instead, the logs Ln = log n should be precomputed and stored for
1 ≤ n ≤ T , along with the log-factorials LFn = Ln+LFn−1. The numbers log
(
T
n
)
are
then calculated easily by LFT − LFn − LFT−n. This procedure was used to generate
Figure 1.
For extremely large values of T and m, direct calculation of p(T,m) becomes fairly
slow, even with the aid of the above recurrence. Fortunately, we can replace p(T,m)
with Shtarkov’s simple (1987) upper bound, which is very accurate. This is shown in
Figure 2.
Shtarkov’s bound:
p(T,m) ≤
m∑
j=1
ajT
(j−1)/2 = O(T (m−1)/2)) , (49)
where
aj =
√
pi
(
m
j
)/{
Γ(j/2) · 2(j−1)/2} . (50)
Thus, the practical method for (approximately) solving log(p(T,m))/T <  is to
carry out the fixed-point iteration:
T = g(T ) = (1/) log
( m∑
j=1
ajT
(j−1)/2
)
. (51)
In the long-run, since log p(T,m) grows at a negligible rate, we will need to roughly
double the horizon in order to cut  in half.
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Figure 1: Worst-case excess per-period continuously-compounded
growth rate (%) of the best rebalancing rule in hindsight over and
above that of the superhedging trader
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Figure 2: The accuracy of Shtarkov’s bound for 2 stocks
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8.4 Failure of high-frequency trading to shorten the required
horizon
It is tempting to think that one can cheat the situation by trading at a higher fre-
quency. However, getting within 1% of the compound annual growth rate of the best
rebalancing rule in hindsight under annual trading (which takes T = 320 years if there
are 2 stocks) is not the same thing as getting within 1% of the hindsight-optimized
growth rate under, say, daily trading, which takes 320 days. Rather, the comparable
requirement is that one must get within (1/252)% of the daily growth rate, assuming
there are 252 trading days per year. For 2 stocks this will take (in the worst case)
156,500 days, or 621 years.
In general, increasing the trading frequency only serves to lengthen the number
of years required to get within  of the hindsight-optimized compound annual growth
rate. This is illustrated in Figure 3. However, we get some compensation from the fact
that the hindsight-optimized rebalancing rule may achieve a higher compound-annual
growth rate under more frequent trading.
In general, let f be the frequency (number of rebalancings per year). It takes
(1/f)T/f years to guarantee to get within  of the compound-annual growth rate of
the hindsight-optimized rebalancing rule that trades f times per year.
Proposition 22. lim
f→∞
(1/f)T/f = +∞, where Tδ denotes the shortest horizon that
solves the inequality log(p(T,m))/T ≤ δ.
Proof. We bound the number T/f from below, as follows. From the asymptotic
expansion of p(T,m) (Cover and Ordentlich 1998), there is a constant A such that
p(T,m) ≥ A · T m−12 , so that log(p(T,m))/T ≥ (log A+ m−1
2
log T )/T . Thus,{
T ∈ N : log(p(T,m))/T ≤ /f} ⊆ {T ≥ 1 : (log A + m−1
2
log T )/T ≤ /f}. Let
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Figure 3: Number of years needed (in the worst case) to get within 1%
of the annualized growth rate of the hindsight-optimized (2-stock)
rebalancing rule that trades at a given frequency.
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T ∗(f) denote the min of this latter set, so that
1
f
T/f ≥ T ∗(f)/f, (52)
where (log A+m−1
2
log T ∗(f))/T ∗(f) = /f . Thus, T ∗(f)/f = (log A+m−1
2
log T ∗(f))/,
which tends to ∞ as f →∞, since T ∗(f)→∞. This gives the desired result.
9 Conclusion
In these pages, we solved the most general tractable version of Cover and Ordentlich’s
(1998) on-line portfolio selection game. This obtains for performance benchmarks (or
exotic options) that are separately convex and homogeneous in each period’s gross-
return vector.
First, we constructed a general theory of “multilinear superhedging” that extends
the Cover-Ordentlich (1998) techniques. A multilinear trading strategy is one whose
final wealth is linear separately in each period’s gross-return vector. A multilinear
superhedge for a given financial derivative is a multilinear trading strategy that guar-
antees to generate more final wealth than the derivative payoff in any outcome.
Since every multilinear final wealth function corresponds to a unique (and for-
mulaic) replicating strategy, one has the convenience of optimizing directly over the
(finite-dimensional) set of multilinear final wealths. If a derivative is separately con-
vex and homogeneous in each period’s return vector, then there is a unique multilinear
superhedge that is cheaper than any other (multilinear or not). This is precisely the
trading strategy that solves the game (and saturates the corresponding variational
preferences). More generally, we showed how the axiom of choice can be used to “find”
exact maximin trading strategies for completely arbitrary (even non-measurable) per-
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formance benchmarks.
This being done, we re-derived the basic results on universal portfolios in a facile
and intelligible manner. We improved Cover and Ordentlich’s somewhat ad-hoc
(1998) approach, which is based on a discrete version of the problem from Shtarkov’s
(1987) theory of universal data compression. Any sufficiently cost-effective super-
hedge of the final wealth of the best rebalancing rule in hindsight will beat the market
asymptotically (by an exponential factor) provided that the best rebalancing rule in
hindsight compounds its money at a higher rate than the best-performing stock in the
market. Basically, this condition is satisfied whenever the realized volatility of stock
prices is sufficiently high. Finally, we showed that higher-frequency trading does not
necessarily guarantee (in the worst case) that the trader will beat the market any
faster.
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